Hotznplotzn

joined 2 years ago
 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/56505579

Here is the report in Polish (pdf) and the report in English (pdf).

How does TikTok show China to Polish users?

Experts from the Polish NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre examined nearly 10,000 pieces of material on six topics considered particularly sensitive by Beijing (Xinjiang, Tibet, Tiananmen Square massacre, Taiwan, human rights, re-education camps). They show that the way content is recommended may be conducive to building a favourable image of China.

Some key points:

  • Many of the materials classified as „pro-China” based on the adopted criteria contained statements fully consistent with messages approved by the Publicity Department and other bodies directly subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

  • There are at least several English-language accounts on the Tiktok app responsible for spreading pro-Chinese propaganda messages. A few characteristics indicate their direct links to the Chinese propaganda mechanism, including they exclusively discuss topics important to Chinese propaganda message, promote an extremely pro-Chinese message, attempt to discredit individuals criticizing the CCP’s actions, and publish large amounts of professionally prepared content despite posing as, for example, ordinary tourists in China.

  • The Tiktok app does not designate state-owned channels as “state-controlled media as Facebook does. This means that it is impossible to determine which channels on the platform operate directly under government control.

  • The examined material raises legitimate doubts about the impartiality of the TikTok app. It is impossible to definitively answer the question whether this is solely the result of the algorithm itself or the presence of a significant number of propaganda channels on the platform, whose activities are not moderated or labeled in any way.

  • This raises doubts, especially considering the platform’s subordination to a Chinese entity (ByteDance) operating within the Chinese legal system. Therefore, the app has significant potential to become a tool for shaping audience attitudes and views in the event of large scale influence operations.

  • Given the scale of Sino-Russian cooperation in information exchange, the TikTok app may pose a potential threat to the security of Polish users. Therefore, it is recommended not only to approach content appearing on the platform critically, but also to refrain from publishing sensitive data on the platform – this is particularly relevant for government entities and individuals associated with the state apparatus.

[...]

The analysis showed that the way content was presented on TikTok differed significantly depending on the topic. The highest percentage of pro-Chinese content was recorded for Xinjiang (58.7%) and Tibet (44.5%). This also applied to the issue of human rights in China (35%).

In turn, the results that referred to the Tiananmen Square massacre were dominated by content critical of the Chinese authorities (76.6%). "We treat such actions as a so-called "safety valve" – a strategy to create the impression of freedom of speech," the analysts write.

In the case of Taiwan, neutral materials predominated (92%). The most unusual results were obtained for the topic of re-education camps – as much as 89% of the displayed materials were not related to the searched topic. "The conclusions of the study clearly show that TikTok uses different content selection strategies for different topics.

"However, we should not focus solely on the operation of one algorithm. This is a question about who shapes the image of the world that millions of users see every day, and how they do it," says Antoni Mazek, an analyst at the NASK Disinformation Analysis Centre and co-author of the report.

[...]

In the flood of information, it is easier to give up further searches In the case of the topic concerning re-education camps, OAD analysts observed a large number of random videos. Unrelated content accounted for as much as 89%. In response to this specific query, several dozen materials appeared praising miraculous methods for weight loss (34% of content on the topic of health/weight loss), and even recordings of Chinese women doing the hula hoop.

"This is intended to discourage users from further searches – explains Dr Agnieszka Lipińska, head of OAD. "It simply causes frustration in the recipient. The search for information on an important topic collides with content that is less intellectually engaging," she adds.

Western influencers reinforce manipulation The analysed content rarely took the form of official messages. It often took the form of travel advertisements or lifestyle content. There was also material featuring Western influencers who constructed their narratives according to a similar pattern: they presented themselves as people "discovering the truth" about China and criticised Western media coverage. It was their materials that were most often recommended to Polish users. Prolonged exposure to such content may affect the perception of China by the audience, according to the researchers.

[...]

[–] Hotznplotzn@lemmy.sdf.org -1 points 3 months ago

... Blackrock CEO Points to Pensions and Retirement Savings

So he wants to copy China's playbook?

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45406772 > cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45406669 > > > Archived > > > > > > Longi Green Energy posted a net loss of AUD180 million (USD 116 million) in the third quarter of 2025, narrowing from $272 million a year earlier as weak demand and price pressure weighed on margins. > > Revenue fell 9.8% year on year to $3.9 billion. For the first three quarters, revenue totaled $11 billion, down 13.1%, while net losses narrowed 47.5% to $739 million. > > > > The company shipped 38.15 GW of wafers and 63.43 GW of cells and modules during the period. BC-series shipments reached 14.48 GW, with HPBC 2.0 modules accounting for 23% of total deliveries. Operating cash inflow was $390 million. > > > > JinkoSolar recorded a net loss of $220 million in the third quarter of 2025 as revenue fell 34.1% year on year to $3.5 billion. Cumulative module shipments for the first three quarters reached 61.9 GW, including more than 200 GW of total N-type Tiger Neo deliveries, while energy storage system shipments exceeded 3.3 GWh. > > > > The company maintained its 2025 full-year shipment guidance at 85–90 GW for modules and 6 GWh for storage systems. > > > > JA Solar registered a net loss of $210 million in the third quarter of 2025, reversing a profit in the same period last year, as revenue fell 34.1% year-on-year to $2.7 billion. > > > > Cumulative module shipments for the first three quarters reached 52 GW, including 18.17 GW in the third quarter. The company expects full-year module shipments of 70–75 GW in 2025 and anticipates faster growth in its energy storage segment. > > > > Flat Glass Group said unaudited revenue for the third quarter ending Sept. 30 was $1 billion, with profit attributable to shareholders totaling $81.3 million. Revenue for the first nine months of 2025 reached $2.69 billion, down 14.6% year-on-year, while profit fell 50.8% to $137 million. > > > > Xinte Energy posted a net loss of $113 million for the nine months ending Sept. 30, 2025, with revenue of $2.5 billion attributable to shareholders of the listed company. > > > > ...

 

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45192281 > Archived > > [...] > > In a historic breach of China’s censorship infrastructure, internal data were leaked from Chinese infrastructure firms associated with the Great Firewall (GFW) in September this year. Researchers now estimate that the data has a volume of approximately 600 GB. > > The material includes more than 100,000 documents, internal source code, work logs, configuration files, emails, technical manuals, and operational runbooks. The number of files in the dump is reported to be in the thousands, though exact totals vary by source. > > [...] > > An unexpected but critical component of the breach is the metadata embedded within documents and logs. Authorship tags, file paths, and computer hostnames have linked hundreds of documents to individual users, systems, and organizations. These human fingerprints offer unprecedented visibility into the organizational structure behind the GFW’s operation. Engineers, data analysts, lab researchers, and regional technicians are all traceable by name or system alias. Many entries refer to known ISPs, national labs, or university-affiliated nodes, suggesting that the enforcement apparatus spans a wide constellation of public-private partnerships, military-academic collaborations, and centralized policy deployment. > > Together, these findings constitute a unique technical cross-section of the Chinese censorship-industrial complex, revealing not just what is filtered or how, but who enforces it, who maintains the infrastructure, and how decisions flow through the layered topology of digital control. > > [...] > > The current report represents only the first installment in a three-part investigative series into the unprecedented breach of China’s censorship apparatus. While this Part 1 has centered on exposing the dataset’s contents and evaluating its technical, organizational, and strategic significance, it is only the beginning. The sheer scale and complexity of the leak, over 500GB of internal GFW infrastructure data, demands a methodical, layered approach to fully grasp its implications. > > The next two parts in this series will delve even deeper, uncovering the architecture of China’s censorship regime and examining the wider consequences for global digital governance. > > Part 2 of the series will look into the architecture and will offer a forensic reconstruction of how the Great Firewall actually works at the technical level, mapping the core design of the censorship stack. This includes how packets are intercepted, filtered, redirected, or dropped; how apps like Psiphon and V2Ray are detected at the protocol level; and how traffic shaping is deployed based on geography, ISP, or session context. > > Part 3 will the geopolitics and the fallout will address the broader implications. This breach does more than just reveal technical controls, it changes the strategic calculus of censorship resistance. We will assess how the exposure reshapes China’s ability to sustain its domestic information control and international cyber operations, and how it informs countermeasures by VPN developers, privacy advocates, and democratic governments. Ethical and legal questions will also be raised: what does responsible engagement with such data look like? > > [...] > > With this series, we aim to present not just the most complete picture yet of the GFW, but a roadmap for pushing back against the machinery of state censorship.